God & Evil

Of the author of sin, we confess that our Lord God, though He is the creator and sustainer of all creatures, yet He is not the author of sin. It is rather the evil will, both in the Devil and in the godless human, that, when he does not obtain help from the Lord God, turns away from God, as Christ speaks in John 8, “When the Devil speaks a lie, he speaks of his own, for he is a liar and the father of lies” (v. 44).

For besides the fact that God, who is supremely good, can make nothing except what is good, if man had been brought forth depraved and evil, God could have had no sufficiently just cause for punishing that wickedness of which he himself would have been the creator and author.

It is true that nature has received a mortal wound, but there is a great difference between a wound inflicted from without, and one inherent in our first condition. It is plain that this wound was inflicted by sin; and, therefore, we have no ground of complaint except against ourselves.

Nor does he become the author of sin by his providence, because that lawlessness is nothing except a defect of operation, of which there cannot exist an author or efficient cause, but only a deficient cause, for which reason alone, the author of sin, insofar as it is such, is the creature, by its transgressing of the law.

To make God the author of sin is such foul blasphemy, that it can never enter any Christian man’s mind without a shudder. It is indeed true that God had made man mutably good, had infallibly foreseen his sin, had foreordained the permission of the sin and given man no doubt sufficient strength to shun sin, but inoperable without His influx; that meanwhile He had inflowed into man’s faculties for natural actions by not inflowing into the moral entity of such actions. … But it is not less true, that God neither is nor could in any way become the author of sin.

In this sense, I utterly deny God to be the Author of Sin; rejecting such an imputation on the Most High, as what is infinitely to be abhorred; and deny any such thing to be the consequence of what I have laid down.

Not unto God; he is not the author of sin, nor tempts unto it; nor is he tempted by it: nor to Satan, only as an instrument, enticing and deceiving; but to themselves, to their own will, it was their own act and deed.

Although all the power of the creature to act is from the Creator, and there is a providence of God always extended to every creature, and to every action of the creature; yet we judge that the final corruption of the creature, and the sinfulness of the creature’s action, is from the creature, and not from God; and that it is a great sin to say that God is the author of sin (Eccl. 7:29; Hab. 1:13; James 1:13–15: 1 Cor. 14:33; 1 John 2:16).

Yes, there is even in ourselves sin and corruption enough, so that there is no need that God should infuse into us either a new or greater measure of wickedness. Therefore, when God is said in the Scripture to harden (Ex. 7:13), to blind (John 12:40) and to deliver us up into a reprobate sense (Rom. 1:28), it is to be understood that God does it by just judgment, as a just judge and avenger.

But although God by his providence governs even sins, yet he is not the cause or author of sin: because he takes no delight in sin, but rather abhors it; nor does he himself sin, or can he sin; likewise because he neither commands nor persuades sin; nor does he pour malice into those who sin, nor compel them to sin; and moreover he directs all things to a good end.

God does not infuse malice into the wills of evil men, as He infuses goodness into the hearts of the godly.—In one and the same work of the godly what is a good and just action proper to God is to be distinguished from the defect and vice of the ungodly. The sin of the wicked is their own; their doing this or that by sinning is of God’s power,—and so in the same work God is ascertained to be righteous, man to be guilty.

And just as he that wishes to punish someone by fumigating with a foul smell, sulfur and dung, does not put a foul smell into the sulfur and dung (it already is there), so God, when He punishes sins through the devil and the vessels of wrath with sins, does not put any sin into them, but it is there naturally since the fall in the devil and in men (Eph. 4; Rom. 1).

Yet we deny that He is the author of sin, or that the blame of things done amiss can be laid upon Him, seeing His will is the sovereign and infallible rule of all righteousness and equity: but this we confess that He has those admirable means as whereby He makes the devils and the ungodly, as His instruments to serve Him and to turn the evil which they do and whereof they are guilty into good.

God might, indeed, by his absolute power, prevent evil; but he will not wrong and despoil his own creature, man, whom he created righteous and holy. He acts with man in a manner that corresponds with the nature with which he has endowed him. Hence he proposes laws to which he attaches rewards and punishments—he commands us to embrace the good and shun the evil; and that we may do this, he both grants his grace, without which we can do nothing, and also encourages our diligence and labor. But if a man come short of doing what he ought, his sin and negligence are chargeable upon himself, and not upon God, although God had the power to prevent it, and yet did not.

We say, then, that man is corrupted by a natural viciousness, but not by one which proceeded from nature. In saying that it proceeded not from nature, we mean that it was rather an adventitious event which befell man, than a substantial property assigned to him from the beginning.

First, the offering of occasions which can be procured only by the peculiar providence of God by the concourse of circumstances and the proposition of objects, fitted to move faculties constituted in this or that way (in which manner God does not infuse wickedness into the minds of men, but draws out into action the wickedness latent there).

The decree which is the cause of the futurition of sin is nevertheless neither its physical cause (by the infusion of evil) nor its ethical cause (by the approbation of it). So although sin necessarily follows the decree, it cannot be said to flow from the decree. The decree does not flow into the thing, nor is it effective of evil, but only permissive and directive.

Now although souls are created by God destitute of original righteousness, God cannot on that account be considered the author of sin. It is one thing to infuse impurity; another not to give the purity of which man has rendered himself unworthy in Adam.

God doth not infuse the lust, or excite it, though he doth present the object about which the lust is exercised. God delivered up Christ to the Jews, he presented him to them, but never commanded them to crucify him, nor infused that malice into them, nor quickened it; but he, seeing such a frame, withdrew his restraining grace, and left them to the conduct of their own vitiated wills. … God created the grape, and filled the vine with a sprightliness, but he doth never infuse a drunken frame into a man, or excite it. … In short, though it be by God's permission that we can do evil, yet it is not by his inspiration that we will to do evil; that is wholly from ourselves.

Though the natural virtue of doing a sinful action be from God, and supported by him, yet this doth not blemish the holiness of God. While God concurs with them in the act, he instills no evil into men. … The physical goodness of the action depends on God, the moral evil on the creature.

For understanding this point, how the providence of God reacheth to and is concerned in sinful actions, we are to consider, that God neither puts evil into the hearts of men, nor stirs them up to it: for, says the apostle, Jam. 1:13. 'God cannot be tempted with evil; neither tempteth he any man.' And therefore he is not the author of sin.

However, this is certain, that God doth not infuse it. Souls receive neither purity nor impurity from him, but only their naked essence, and the natural powers and properties flowing therefrom. He doth not infuse any impurity into men; for he cannot be the author of sin, who is the revenger of it. … As a pure and holy God, he cannot infuse any impurity into the souls of men; and as a just and righteous God, he may and doth withhold from, or create them void and destitute of, that holiness and righteousness which was once their happiness and glory.

In order to account for a sinful corruption of nature, yea, a total native depravity of the heart of man, there is not the least need of supposing any evil quality, infused, implanted, or wrought into the nature of man, by any positive cause, or influence whatsoever, either from God, or the creature; or of supposing, that man is conceived and born with a fountain of evil in his heart, such as is any thing properly positive.

But He is not the author of the evil dispositions with which that nature is infected at birth. The doctrine of original sin attributes no efficiency to God in the production of evil. It simply supposes that He judicially abandons our apostate race, and withholds from the descendants of Adam the manifestations of his favour and love, which are the life of the soul.

When God is here spoken of as hardening some of the children of men, it is not to be understood that God by any positive efficiency hardens any man's heart. There is no positive act in God, as though he put forth any power to harden the heart. To suppose any such thing would be to make God the immediate author of sin. God is said to harden men in two ways: by withholding the powerful influences of his Spirit, without which their hearts will remain hardened, and grow harder and harder; in this sense he hardens them, as he leaves them to hardness. And again, by ordering those things in his providence which, through the abuse of their corruption, become the occasion of their hardening.

God hardens some men's hearts, as he did Pharaoh's, and he wills to harden them, or he hardens them according to his decreeing will; "Whom he will he hardens", (Romans 9:18) this he does not by any positive act, by infusing hardness and blindness into the hearts of men; which is contrary to his purity and holiness, and would make him the author of sin; but by leaving men to their natural blindness and hardness of heart; for the understanding is naturally darkened; and there is a natural blindness, hardness, and callousness of heart, through the corruption of nature, and which is increased by habits of sinning.

For two things are to be considered in evil actions: the action itself, and the ἀνομία [anomia, lawlessness] of the action. The action itself, as a natural motion, takes place by the efficacious working of God; but the anomia or wickedness takes place by the active permission of God. … for as in a horse the cause of the motion is one thing and the cause of the limping another, so it is one thing to be the cause of the action and another to be the cause of the wickedness cleaving to it.

Although the premotion of God is extended to evil actions, it does not on that account make God guilty of the fault or the author of sin. It only pertains to actions inasmuch as they are material and entitative (entitative), not however as they are moral, i.e., to the substance of the act, but not to its wickedness. … The magistrate is the cause of the death inflicted on the guilty person by the executioner, but is not the cause of the cruelty exhibited in that execution; the harp player is the cause of the sound, but not of the dissonance arising from the strings; and he who drives a lame horse is the cause of the motion, but not the lameness.

In evil actions, however, he so concurs as neither to effect, assist, nor approve of them, but to permit and efficaciously direct; not by infusing wickedness, but by so determining rational creatures physically to the substance of the act in the genus of being, that they (when left to themselves failing from the law) move and determine themselves to bad actions in the genus of morals, performing them freely and voluntarily (hekousiōs). Hence the guilt rests upon them alone.

Yet we are able to reconcile them easily enough, if we distinguish within sin its material element, namely, the habit or act that is the substrate of the wickedness, with which, inasmuch as it is physically good, God is not able not to concur as the efficient cause, without casting aside his own independence (Acts 17:28; Rom. 11:36), and its formal element, lawlessness (1 John 3:4), through which the act or habit is sin, whose author he cannot be, because the one set above all law cannot transgress the law.

God by his influence is indeed the principal cause of the act itself, but man is the sole cause of the sin itself, which is in that act. … Nor can even one theologian be shown who has said that God is the author of lawlessness, or of sin insofar as it is sin.

But we teach that the action of God and of men sinning is the same, according to material being, but not according to moral being. … But truly the action of God and of men is not the same according to moral being; because God acts justly from all four causes, while he punishes the Church through sinning instruments; but the action of the instruments is morally unjust and vicious. … But we teach that God is not the cause of the malice, although he is the cause of the act.

Every action, as such, is undoubtedly good, it being an actual exertion of those operative powers given us by God for that very end; God therefore may be the Author of all actions (as He undoubtedly is), and yet not be the Author of evil. … Suppose a boy, who knows not how to write, has his hand guided by his master and nevertheless makes false letters, quite unlike the copy set him, though his preceptor, who guides his hand, is the cause of his writing at all, yet his own ignorance and unskilfulness are the cause of his writing so badly. Just so, God is the supreme Author of our action, abstractedly taken, but our own vitiosity is the cause of our acting amiss.

The power of action is from God, but the viciousness of that action from our own nature. As when a clock or watch hath some fault in any of the wheels, the man that winds it up, or putting his hand upon the wheels moves them, he is the cause of the motion, but it is the flaw in it, or deficiency of something, is the cause of its erroneous motion. … Our motion is from God,—Acts 17:28, 'In him we move',—but not the disorder of that motion.

There is a fallacy of the accident in the minor proportion; for the actions of the wicked are sins, not (per se) in themselves, in as far as they are actions; but by an accident on account of the want of righteousness, and of the perversity of the will of the ungodly, who do not observe this so as to follow in the action the will of God.

The influences of divine providence concur with every action, be it what it may, as an action, since all live, and move, and have their being in God; every action, as an action, is from God; but the obliquity, irregularity, and sinfulness of the action, is from the creature: wherefore God is not the author of any sin.

As to the pravity or sin that is in actions, as God decreed the futurition of sin, or permitted it to take place, and did not hinder it; so all the sin or vitiosity that is in actions proceeds entirely from the creature, and the evil lusts and passions that are in his heart. Thus a man's taking up a stone, and throwing it, is a natural action, which the providence of God enables him to perform; but his throwing it at another man with an intention to kill him, is permitted by God, otherwise it could not take place.

As there is a vast difference between the sun being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere, and the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence; and its being the occasion of darkness and frost, in the night, by its motion, whereby it descends below the horizon. The motion of the sun is the occasion of the latter kind of events; but it is not the proper cause, efficient, or producer of them; though they are necessarily consequent on that motion, under such circumstances: no more is any action of the Divine Being the cause of the evil of men's Wills.

He who uses as an instrument a man freely failing, to effect what is good, is not the author of the failure. … The wicked, while they sin, are not properly instruments of God moved, that is to say, without an internal principle of motion, but metaphorically, moved in such a way that they freely move themselves.

Not by permitting the evil action, because he is bound by no law to hinder sin. Not by determining it; for as he who puts out a fire so that it may not spread further is not the cause of the fire, so he who fixes bounds to sin is not the cause of sin. Not by directing it to a good end; for as it is the highest art to prepare a wholesome medicine from venomous animals, so it is glorious for God to draw light even out of darkness, and something good out of evils.

God acted nothing, but only ceased to act, and therefore could not be the efficient cause of man’s sin. As God is not the author of good but by willing and effecting it, so he is not the author of evil but by willing and effecting it. But he doth not positively will evil, nor effect it by any efficacy of his own. Permission is no action, nor the cause of that action which is permitted, but the will of that person who is permitted to do such an action is the cause.

He wills it not by his effective will, but by his permissive will; and therefore cannot be chargeable with being the author of sin; since there is a wide difference between doing it himself, and doing it by others, or ordering it to be done, which only can make him the author of sin; and voluntarily permitting or suffering it to be done by others.

The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God, so far manifest themselves in His providence, that His determinate counsel extends itself even to the first fall, and all other sinful actions both of angels and men (Rom. 11:32–34; 2 Sam. 24:1; 1 Chron. 21:1); and that not by a bare permission, which also He most wisely and powerfully bounds, and otherwise orders and governs (2 Kings 19:28; Ps. 76:10), in a manifold dispensation to His most holy ends (Gen. 50:20; Isa. 10:6–7, 12); yet so, as the sinfulness of their acts proceeds only from the creatures, and not from God, who, being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin (Ps. 50:21; 1 John 2:16).

We believe that the same good God, after He had created all things, did not forsake them or give them up to fortune or chance, but that He rules and governs them according to His holy will, so that nothing happens in this world without His appointment; nevertheless, God neither is the author of nor can be charged with the sins which are committed. For His power and goodness are so great and incomprehensible that He orders and executes His work in the most excellent and just manner, even then when devils and wicked men act unjustly.

And this is the decree of reprobation, which by no means makes God the Author of sin (the very thought of which is blasphemy), but declares Him to be an awful, irreprehensible, and righteous Judge and Avenger thereof.